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COMMENTS
BIG MEDIA: ITS EFFECT ON THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS AND

HOW TO SLOW THE URGE
TO MERGE
"[Tihere exists in America a control of news and of current comment
more absolute than any monopoly in any other industry."1
2
"Freedom of the press belongs to those who own one."
I.

INTRODUCTION

The free flow of information is the life-blood of democracy. 3 Access to
diverse opinions and perspectives enables Americans to participate effectively in our democracy. 4 We depend on the media to provide us with
such access and to hold public officials accountable for their policies and
actions. 5 James Madison wrote, "[a] popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce
or a tragedy, or perhaps both."6 The Founding Fathers enshrined the
idea of a free press 7 in the First Amendment. 8 The Constitution does not
extend this measure of protection to any other segment of American
industry.9
1. Upton Sinclair, The Brass Check, 241 (1919).
2. A.J. Liebling, The Wayward Pressman,265 (1947) (discussing that large corporate
ownership of media organizations is of a central concern).
3. Senator Paul Wellstone, Growing Media ConsolidationMust Be Examined to Preserve Our Democracy, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 551, 551 (May 2000) (discussing the important
role that mass media plays in the dissemination of ideas and opinions).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 552 (stating also that the greater amount of diversity that exists in the ownership of media organization allows media to perform its functions better).
6. Id. at 552-53.
7. Id. at 552.
8. U.S. Const. Amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id.
9. Wellstone, supra n. 3, at 551.
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In the past decade, there have been many media corporate unions,
most notably Disney and Capital Cities/ABC, Viacom and CBS, and the
largest media merger to date, America Online ("AOL") and TimeWarner. 10 These media mergers may make good sense economically, but
what about their impact on news organizations? The First Amendment
prohibits only government interference in the "marketplace of ideas;"" it
says nothing, however, about potential domination of the marketplace of
ideas by large media organizations. 12 Although corporate control of the
press has been a concern for more than a century, 13 the recent media
merger trend has re-ignited fears over the possible degradation of jour14
nalism by corporate interests.
Most Americans would agree that government-imposed censorship
is unacceptable. Critics charge though the media regularly imposes self10. See generally Aaron Moore, Who Owns What, Columbia Journalism Rev. <http://
www.cjr.orgfowners> (accessed Apr. 15, 2002) (offering a list of recent media mergers).
This Web site offers access to news and information about companies involved in recent
media marriages. See generally id. On the Web site, one can find information about recent
mergers involving Disney, Hollinger International, AOL/Time-Warner, and many others.
See id. The Web site is maintained by members of the Columbia JournalismReview. See
id.; see generally ABC News, Media Mergers Timeline <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections /cbs_viacomchronology_990907.html> (Jan. 10, 2000) (showing a timeline of recent
media mergers dating back to the 1986 acquisition of the American Broadcasting Corp. by
Capital Cities Communications, Inc.).
11. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (holding that broadcasting was to "function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment").
"It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee." Id. (citing Associated
Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). The court further stated that "[i]t is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here." Id.; see Peter H. Nesvold, Communication Breakdown:
Developing and Antitrust Model for Multimedia Mergers and Acquisitions, 6 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 781, 869 n. 20 (1996) (discussing the birth of the term "marketplace of ideas"). Most scholars, though, attribute the concept of a "marketplace of ideas"
to Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. U.S. Id. Justice Holmes wrote: "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12. See Symposium, Panel I: The Changing Landscape of Jurisprudencein the Light of
the New Communicationsand MediaAlliances, 6 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J.
427, 434 (1996) [hereinafter Panel I] (stating also that the Free Speech Clause contained in
the First Amendment does not mandate a "positive government program of action").
13. See e.g. Sinclair, supra n. 1, at 241; see generally Commission on Freedom of the
Press, A Free and Responsible Press:A GeneralReport on Mass Communication:Newspapers, Radio, Motion Pictures, Magazines, and Books (U. of Chicago Press, 1947); see generally Robert W. McChesney, Corporate Media and the Threat to Democracy (Seven Stories
Press 1998).
14. Id. at 24-26 (discussing the "death of journalism" caused by corporate interests).
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censorship. 15 Would ABC News report something negative about Disney? Will we ever see Katie Couric dedicate a segment of the Today
Show to recalled General Electric products? Examples exist that would
suggest probably not. 16 Like it or not, the business of the media is to
make money, 17 and, like other industries, there are pressures to succeed
and satisfy the demands of company stakeholders.' 8 These economic
pressures have led to news department staff reductions, 19 and as some
critics claim, the loss of editorial independence and the manipulation
and dilution of news content. 20 When we as citizens feel that politicians
are not serving our needs or interests, we can show our disapproval at
the ballot box. We have no such recourse with the seemingly omnipotent
media organizations. Just change the channel, right? What if that very
same multimedia conglomerate owns the next channel over, and the next
channel, and the next channel, and the next channel?
Misguided antitrust scrutiny, the passage of the Telecommunica15. See e.g. Andrew Kohut, Self-Censorship: Counting the Ways, Columbia Journalism
Rev.
14 (May/June, 2000) (available at <http://www.cjr. org/year/00/2/censorship.asp>).
16. See infra nn. 204-96 and accompanying text (providing examples of self-censorship,
news coverage reduction, and news content manipulation).
17. See James Talbott, Will Mega-Media Mergers Destroy Hollywood and Democracy?,
18 Ent. Sports Law 9 (Spring 2000).
18. Interview: Mark Crispin Miller
4 <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frortline/
shows/coolinterviews/crispinmiller.html> (accessed Nov. 27, 2001) (discussing the economic pressures placed upon media organization by company shareholders). Mr. Miller is
a media critic and professor at New York University. Id. AOLfTime-Warner recently reported a $54 billion loss, the largest in U.S. history. Record $54 Billion AOL Time Warner
Loss, Chi. Trib. 1 1 (Apr. 25, 2002) (available at <http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/
cnet/chi024250217apr25.story?coll=chi%2Dbusinessstocks%2Dhed>).
This loss represents an amount greater than the annual gross domestic product of Ecuador, Croatia, Uruguay, Kenya, or Bulgaria. James Bates, AOL $50-Billion Loss is One From the Books, Chi.
Trib.
2 (Apr. 24, 2002) (available at <http'//www.chicagotribune.com/technology/la042402losses.story>). Viacom admitted a $1.1 billion loss. Seth Sutel, Viacom Posts $1.1
Billion Loss, Chi. Trib.
1 (Apr. 25, 2002) (available at <http://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/sns-ap-earns-viacom0425apr25.story>).
19. See McChesney, Corporate Media, supra n. 13, at 24-26 (discussing the rash of
layoffs and resignations within the industry); see Keith Conrad, Media Mergers: FirstStep
in a New Shift of Antitrust Analysis?, 49 Fed. Comm. L.J. 675, 682 (discussing how profit
motives have forced major job cuts in many large news organizations resulting in a reduction of substantive local and national news).
20. See generally e.g. Neil Hickey, Coping with Mega-Mergers, Columbia Journalism
Rev. (Mar./Apr., 2000) (available at <http://www.cjr.org/year/00/2/aoltw.asp> (2002) [hereinafter Hickey, Coping]; see Robert H. Lande, Statement of Professor Robert H. Lande on
Behalf of The American Antitrust Institute at the Hearing on the America Online/ TimeWarner Merger Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United
States Senate <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/59.cfm> (accessed May 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Lande, Statement]. "[A] handful of media firms would not be sufficient for the
diversity of viewpoints in a democracy." Id. at T 7.
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tions Act of 1996 ("Telecom Act"), 21 and fundamental changes at the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), have resulted in a flurry of
media mergers. The current method of media merger antitrust scrutiny
employs only an analysis of the potential economic effects of a proposed
merger. 2 2 Very little if any regard is given to a merger's social and political implications. In line with Supreme Court cases, legislative history,
an influential commentary, this Comment will propose a new antitrust
model specifically-tailored for use in media merger review, which, like
the marketplace of ideas itself, goes beyond mere economic
considerations.
The Telecom Act effectively reworked 60 plus years of U.S. telecommunications law. 23 By scaling back or eliminating all together many
longstanding regulations concerning market concentration, 2 4 and crossownership, 2 5 the Telecom Act has contributed to today's media merger
fad. 2 6 Instead of increasing competition through deregulation, 27 the
Telecom Act helped pave the way for companies like AOL/Time-Warner
and Viacom to gobble up other media outlets and actually impede competition. This Comment will put forth proposals on amending the Telecom
Act to stop, or at least slow down, this recent media merger frenzy.
The FCC has also contributed to the recent media merger trend by
seemingly going against its core directives. The FCC was established by
Congress to promote the "diversity of media voices, vigorous economic
competition, . . .and . . .the public interest, convenience, and necessity."28 The Telecom Act reaffirmed the FCC's public interest mission. 2 9
However, because of recent policy and priority changes at the FCC, and
21. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
22. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 818-20 (discussing the economic approach to antitrust
analysis through the dominate Chicago School perspective); see also Conrad, supra n. 19, at
677.
23. Harold Feld, The Need for FCC Merger Review, 18 Commun. Law., 20 (Fall 2000).
24. The Telecom Act all but eliminates governmental restrictions on the amount of television stations a person or corporation may "directly or indirectly own, operate, or control,
or have a cognizable interest in nationwide." 47 U.S.C. § 336(c)(1)(A) (1996) (regarding
national ownership limitations). The Telecom Act also raises the amount of national viewers that a group of television stations under the same ownership can serve from 25 percent
to 35 percent. 47 U.S.C. 336(c)(1)(B) (1996) (regarding national ownership percentage
limitations).
25. The Telecom Act abolishes cross-ownership restrictions of cable systems. 47 U.S.C.
§ 336(f)(1) (1996) (regarding elimination of restrictions on cable cross ownership).
26. See Nevsold, supra n. 11, at 846 (discussing the effects of the passage of the
Telecom Act). The Telecom Act contributed "to the rise of media competition and consolidation." Id.
27. Cf id. (discussing the overall purpose behind the Telecom Act). The Telecom Act
eliminat[es] regulatory barriers that block competition." See id. at 847.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (1996) (discussing the FCC's public interest standard).
29. Id.
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its relatively low profile during the review of two of the largest media
mergers in history, this Comment calls into question its commitment to
the public interest.
The trend toward corporate consolidation within the media industry
poses a major threat to democracy and the marketplace of ideas 30 by allowing "too much power in too few hands [thus] impair[ing] freedom of
expression." 3 1 If the current laissez faire attitude toward media mergers
is allowed to continue, then it is possible to foresee a day when an even
smaller number of large media companies dominate the television and
radio airwaves, telephony, and cyberspace. 3 2 Each and every proposed
media merger should receive antitrust scrutiny that takes social and political concerns into consideration, the FCC should continue to maintain
its "public interest" standard for merger review, and the Telecom Act,
after its failure at sparking meaningful competition, should be amended
to not allow further consolidation within the industry.
Part II of this Comment begins with an introductory discussion on
mergers and acquisitions, including some of the advantages of such unions. It then will outline applicable antitrust law doctrines and introduce the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Part III of the Comment
begins with a discussion on how media mergers have affected journalism, and discusses some of the major arguments for and against these
types of corporate unions. Finally, the Comment will put forth proposals
on how to stop, or at least slow down, the media merger trend by application of tougher and broader antitrust scrutiny, by amending the Telecom
Act, and by greater FCC involvement in media merger review.
II. BACKGROUND
A.
1.

MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS

Introduction

A merger is the "permanent union of previously separated enterprises."3 3 A merger is achieved when a company purchases the holdings
of another corporation, thus absorbing that firm into one larger com30. See Red Lion Broadcasting,395 U.S at 390; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (remarking that the "debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open").
31. See FTC Chiefto Test Theory in Review of Turner Deal, Robert Pitofsky is Making it
ClearHe Believes Media Mergers Deserve Special Scrutiny, Atlanta J & Const. 7 (Oct. 10,
1995) (available at 1995 WL 6555995) (discussing former Federal Trade Commission
Chairman Pitofsky's views on media mergers).
32. See Nesvold, supra, n. 11, at 786 (stating his view of what will ultimately occur if
media mergers are allowed to proliferate unchecked). "[Tihe public may soon find that four
or five companies control nearly all the information delivered into homes over television
airwaves, cable, or computer modems." Id.
33. Id. at 799.
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pany. 34 The purchaser then acquires the assets and liabilities of the ac-

quired company. 35 "[Miergers, joint ventures, and cooperation among
competitors have increasingly become a competitive necessity in order to
invest in and exploit research and development." 3 6 The increased size
gives corporations more time to respond to change before losses begin to
seriously affect share prices. 3 7 Mergers may help an emerging firm gain
credit, notoriety, respectability, or excellent tax benefits. 38 In the United
States, antitrust laws, under the authority of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 3 9 are used to ensure that certain mergers and acquisitions do not
40
result in monopolies.
Mergers allow two companies to achieve what is known in business
circles as synergy. 4 1 Synergy is created, when the consolidated compa42
nies are worth more as a single entity than as separate companies.
43
Think of synergy as 1+1=3.
The united companies can reduce overhead by eliminating transaction costs and duplicate operations, 4 4 thus
improving overall product or service quality, and theoretically, boosting
output. 4 5 Opponents of synergy call it an "annihilation of competi46
tion."
Mergers are classified into three major categories: 4 7 (1) horizontal
mergers, which involve competitors selling the same product;48 (2) verti34. Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and CorporateRestructurings, 7 (John
Wiley & Sons 1996) (regarding the motivations behind mergers as well as the process of
acquiring another company).
35. Id.
36. Panel I, supra n. 12, at 440 (discussing the need for corporate mergers within the
communications industry as necessary to stay competitive).
37. Gaughan, supra n. 34, at 104.
38. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 789 n. 39.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
40. See Symposium, Panel II: The Economic and Regulatory Issues of Convergence, 9
Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 461, 465 (Winter 1999) [hereinafter Panel II].
41. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 791.
42. Id.
43. See Gaughan, supra n. 34, at 104 (explaining that in chemistry the term synergy
refers to when two chemicals come together to form a more powerful compound or reaction
than the sum of their separate parts).
44. Cf id. at 8 (explaining the motivations behind many mergers and acquisitions).
One of the most common reasons why firms consolidate is expansion into other markets.
Id. Other motivations include an improvement in management and various tax benefits.
Id. at 104.
45. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 791.
46. See Conrad, supra n. 19, at 679 (quoting former FCC Commissioner Nicholas
Johnson).
47. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 793.
48. See Gaughan, supra n. 34, at 7-8 (discussing the relaxation of federal antitrust
laws). "If a horizontal merger causes the combined firm to experience an increase in market power that will have anti-competitive effects, the merger may be opposed on antitrust
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cal mergers, which bring together companies that were once buyers and
sellers of a product or service;4 9 and (3) conglomerate mergers, which
form new corporations from firms that served different markets. 50 Vertical mergers receive the most scrutiny from federal regulators 5 1 because
they "act as a clog on competition, [ I which deprives .. .rivals the fair
opportunity to compete." 52 Simply stated, vertical mergers allow a company to internalize all operations, thus leaving competitors without cus53
tomers or suppliers.
2. Mergers are attractive to media organizationsfor a variety of
reasons
Among the typical economic benefits of consolidation, 54 there are
three unique motives compelling media organizations to form large partnerships. 55 The first is that media mergers often unite massive production and distribution entities 5 6 allowing "self-dealing." 5 7 Second, the
new larger media companies will be in a better position to exploit their
copyright holdings. 58 Third, media mergers allow companies "to repack59
age existing properties and create cross-promotions."
a.

Media mergers allow unification of production and distribution
entities
Large vertical mergers allow some companies to internalize all or

grounds." See id. "[Hiowever, the government has been somewhat liberal in allowing horizontal mergers to go unopposed." Id. at 8.
49. Panel I, supra n. 12, at 431.
50. Gaughan, supra n. 34, at 8.
51. Cf Panel I, supra n. 12, at 431.
52. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (citing Section 7 of the Clayton
Act). The Court held that the Clayton Act does not forbid all vertical mergers, only those
that "substantially [ ] lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." Id.
53. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 797. See also e.g. U.S. v. ParamountPictures,334 U.S.
131, 149 (1948) (regarding the motion picture industry); U.S. v.AT&T, 534 F. Supp. 1336,
1348-57 (D.D.C. 1981) (regarding the telephone industry).
54. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 788 (discussing two major economic benefits of mergers and acquisitions). The first advantage is that mergers and acquisitions place goods and
services in the hands of the "most effective managers." Id. at 789. The second reason to
consolidate with another firm is to achieve "economies of scale" or "synergies." Id. at 79091. The two companies typically become worth more together than apart. Id. at 791. It
also follows that the newly formed corporation will be able to reduce transactional costs,
and, in theory, improve overall quality and output. Id.
55. See Conrad, supra n. 19, at 680-81.
56. Id. at 680.
57. David Waterman, CBS-Viacom and the Effects of Media Mergers:An Economic Per.
spective, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 531, 536 (2000).
58. See Conrad, supra n. 19, at 680-81.
59. Id. at 681.
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nearly all of their operations. 60 In the case of media organizations, vertical integration allows one company to own or control the stages of the
production and distribution of a particular program. 6 1 The same company can then use its various properties to promote the project. 6 2 From
an economic perspective, self-dealing has several distinct advantages. 6 3
64
First, self-dealing often reduces the overall cost of program production.
Second, common ownership often reduces the risk that a competing network will pick up a particular program. 65 Finally, ideas for programs
are more effectively circulated between network executives and program
66
producers and vice versa.
Disney is one such company that internalizes a great deal of its production and distribution operations. 6 7 When Disney purchased Capital
Cities/ABC for $19 billion, 68 it was the second largest media merger in
history at the time, 6 9 and involved an extensive film library that includes The Lion King, Toy Story, Dumbo, and Snow White. 70 ABC will
almost certainly get first choice on Disney original programming. 7 ' As
one commentator noted, "[olne of the reasons Disney wanted ABC was so
that it could rerun its vast library of movies and cartoons on networks
TV rather than on its lower-rated cable channel." 7 2 Judson Greene,
president of Walt Disney Attractions, said, "I think we wrote the book on
73
synergy."
60. See Panel II, supra n. 40, at 465.
61. See Waterman, supra n. 57, at 536.
62. See Conrad, supra n. 19, at 680.
63. Waterman, supra n. 57, at 538.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cf Conrad, supra n. 19, at 680.
68. Id. at 678.
69. Id. The Disney/ABC merger has since been surpassed by the $80 million CBS/
Viacom merger. See Viacom and CBS to Merge in Largest Media Transaction Ever 1 1
<http://www.viacom.com/merger> (accessed Oct. 2. 2000) (offering a detailed account of the
mergers and the holdings owned by each company). See AOL-Time Warner Merger 1
<http://www.pbs.org/n.. .usinessljan/juneOO/aol_01-10a.html> (accessed Oct. 2, 2000) (discussing the ramifications of the then proposed merger). This merger now holds the record
for the largest media transaction in history. Id.
70. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 678. The merger also involved a massive broadcasting,
entertainment, and merchandising empire. Id. It not only involved the ABC television and
radio networks, but the Disney theme parks; the Disney Channel; movie production house
Miramax; Touchstone Pictures; and Hollywood Pictures; cable staple ESPN; and numerous
radio and television station across the country. Id.
71. Id. at 679 (discussing the advantages of synergized corporations).
72. Warren Cohen & Katia Hetter, Tomorrow's Media Today, U.S. News and World
Report, 47-48 (Aug. 14, 1995).
73. See Conrad, supra n. 19, at 679.
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b.

Media mergers permit effective exploitation on copyright holdings

Consolidated media companies can harvest bigger profits by full exploitation of their copyright licenses through effective promotion and
marketing. 74 For example, Time-Warner 75 from time to time packages
77
76
together a few James Bond movies and calls it "15 Nights of 007."
The packaging brings in more viewers than would a showing of a single
film from the popular movie series. 78 The company can then cross-promote the Bond film festival, or any other programming event, on TBS,
Cartoon Network, Turner Network Television, Cable News Network, and
CNN Headline News, etc. The company can also run promotional advertisements in Time, People, and Sports Illustrated, and other publications
79
it operates.
c.

Vast holdings allow repackagingand cross-promotion

Merged companies can use their vast resources to cross-channel promote original and special events programming.8 0 For example, Super
Bowl XXXV aired on CBS. 8 ' A broadcast of MTV's Total Request Live,
hosted by Carson Daly, was the pre-game show. 8 2 Blockbuster, yet another Viacom property, sponsored the game and pre-game shows. 8 3 The
company can then cross-promote the Super Bowl on CMT, BET, TNN,
MTV, or on its vast network of Infinity Broadcasting radio stations.

B.

ANTITRUST LAW:

A

PRIMER

Trusts and monopolies are concentrations of wealth in the hands of a
few individuals or corporations. 8 4 It is believed that these combinations
of economic resources are harmful to the public and individuals because
these trusts minimize, if not eliminate, competition, and generate for
74. See id. at 680.
75. Time-Warner is now a division of AOL/Time-Warner. See generally AOL-Time
Warner Merger, supra n. 69.
76. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 679.
77. See The Man with the Golden Gun (TBS Oct. 15, 2000) (tv broadcast) (promoting
the movie as part of "15 Days of 007").
78. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 679.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Super Bowl XXXV (CBS Jan. 28, 2001) (tv broadcast).
82. See CBS Sports Press Conference T15 <http://www.superbowl.com/u/xxxv/features/
cbsOl2301.html> (accessed Oct. 17, 2001).
83. Super Bowl XXXV (CBS Jan. 28, 2001) (tv broadcast).
1 <http:l
84. Legal Information Institute, Law about Antitrust: Overview
www.law.cornell. edu/topics/antitrust.html> (accessed July 13, 2001); see Nesvold, supra n.
11, at 819 (stating that "[tihe primary-if not exclusive-evil that antitrust jurisprudence
is to protect against is the creation or exercise of market power").
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consumers higher prices and lower quality.8 5 Antitrust law's objective is
to assure a competitive economy, based upon the view that, through competition, consumer needs will be satisfied at the lowest price with the
least amount of sacrifice of scarce resources.8 6 Promoting consumer
choice is perhaps the most important role of antitrust law. 8 7 In seeking
to create or preserve a climate conducive to a competitive economy, the
antitrust laws rely upon the operation of free enterprise to decide what
shall be produced, how scarce resources shall be allocated among the various factors of production, and to whom the various products will be distributed.8 8 Ensuring economic freedom for competitors and consumers
has been held to be as important as the preservation of our personal freedoms.8 9 Antitrust law has been called the "Magna Carta"90 of the free
enterprise system. 9 1
1.

Relevant Antitrust Statutes

a.

Sherman Act

In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act 9 2 to prevent
trusts from creating unfair restraints on trade or commerce and reducing
marketplace competition. 93 The Sherman Act was enacted to preserve
economic liberty, and to eliminate unfair restraints on trade and economic competition. 9 4 "The [Sherman Act] was concrete recognition of the
public's interest in controlling monopoly power, an interest that was not
dependent for its indication in the initiative of private individuals injured directly by the monopolist's conduct."95 The Sherman Act is still
the chief source of U.S. antitrust law today and most states have similar
85. Id. See also Natl. Socy. of Prof Engr. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (discussing
the role of competition in the overall quality of goods and services). No specific proof is
required to prove that a combination will cause higher prices, there must be merely an
"appreciable danger" of such harm in the future. See Kevin J. Arquit and Richard Wolfram, Mergers and Acquisitions: United States Government Antitrust Analysis and Enforcement, 1251 Practising Law Institute/Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
317, 323 (May 2001).
86. Ernest Gellhorn, Antitrust Law and Economics: In a Nutshell, 41 (West 1976).
87. Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal ofAntitrust, 62 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 503, 503 (Spring, 2001) [hereinafter Lande, Consumer Choice].
88. Gellhorn, supra n. 86, at 41.
89. Jerrold G. Van Cise, et. al., Understandingthe Antitrust Laws, 26 (Practising Law
Institute 1986).
90. See U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (describing the importance
of antitrust law).
91. Van Cise, supra n. 89, at 26.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).
93. Legal Information Institute, supra n. 84, at 2.
94. Id.
95. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219,
1219 (1988).
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statutes. 9
Section 1 of the Sherman Act ("Section 1"), reads that: "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 9 7 With this broad language, Congress

left it to the courts to determine what types of business behavior would
be prohibited under Section 1.98 Over the years, courts developed two
categories of antitrust analysis: "per se" and "rule of reason."9 9 Per se
offenses are presumed to be violations of Section 1.100 Price-fixing,
group boycotts, and certain "tying" arrangements are examples of "per
se" antitrust violations.1 0 1 There are other business activities for which
anti-competitive behavior is not so clearly defined. 10 2 For such situations, courts use the "rule of reason" approach to ascertain whether the
business behavior's pro-competitive benefits outweigh any anti-competitive effects. 103 The "rule of reason" analysis is applied to most vertical
10 4
mergers.
96. Legal Information Institute, supra n. 84, at [ 2-4.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1. The section reads as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Id.
98. Conrad M. Shumadine & Michael R. Katchmark, Antitrust and the Media, 679
Practising Law Institute/Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series 7, 47 (Nov. 2001).
99. Id. at 47-48.
100. Id. at 47.
101. Id. at 49.
102. Id. at 47-48.
103. Id. at 48; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (discussing
the "rule of reason" approach). Justice Brandeis wrote:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the Court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint,
and its effect, actual or probable. The instrument of the restraint, the evil believed
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose of end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save
an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id.; see also Natl. Socy. of Prof Engr., 435 U.S. at 690-92 (stating that the rule of reason
approach attempts to balance the anti-competitive effects of a restraint on trade against its
pro-competitive benefits to determine its impact on competition).
104. Shumadine, supra n. 98, at 51.
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The Clayton Act

While mergers and acquisitions may receive regulatory scrutiny
under Section 1 and, to a certain extent, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 10 5
generally federal regulators will review vertical business consolidations
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act ("Section 7"). 106 Section 7107 and its
subsequent amendments, 10 8 regulate mergers and acquisitions by stating that "no person ... shall acquire... any part of the assets of another
person... where in any line of commerce... in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." 10 9 In addition, unlike the Sherman
Act, Section 7 does not require actual proof of the effect of anti-competitive or monopolistic behavior. 1 10 Only a "reasonable probability" of detriment to market competition will satisfy Section 7.111 As one would
expect, the "reasonable probability" standard allows the Government
112
and private litigants great latitude in the merger review process.
The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe v. U.S.' 13 outlined modern antitrust analysis. 114 The Court looked at legislative history and, although
it did not set forth a definitive test for antitrust merger analysis, the
Court did establish that economic principles should be the guide in Section 7's application. 115 In following the guidance in Brown Shoe, subse105. Id. at 304.
106. Arquit, supra n. 85, at 323.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
108. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 803 (discussing the amendments to the Clayton Act).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
110. Shumadine, supra n. 98, at 304.
111. Id. at 304-05.
112. Id. at 305. In FTC v. Proctor& Gamble Co., the Supreme Court explained Section
7's rationale:
The core question [under Section 7] is whether a merger may substantially lessen
competition, and [that] necessarily requires a prediction of the merger's impact on
competition, present and future. [Section 7] can only deal with probabilities, not
with certainties... If the enforcement of [Section 7] turned on the existence of actual competitive practices, the congressional policy of thwarting such practices in
their incipiency would be frustrated.
386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
113. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
114. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 802.
115. See id. at 802-03. Chief Justice Warren in his majority in the Brown Shoe case
wrote that "[a] review of legislative history of [Section 7 and its subsequent amendment]
provides no unmistakably clear indication of the precise standards the Congress wished the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts to apply in judging the legality of particular
mergers." Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315. According to the Court, mergers shall be evaluated with several factors in mind. Id. at 321-22. Two such factors are: (1) how concentrated the particular industry is, and (2) whether the particular industry "had seen a
recent trend toward domination by a few leaders or had remained fairly consistent in its
distribution of market shares among the participating companies." Id.
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quent cases have developed a three-prong test for antitrust merger
analysis. 11 6 The first element is "defining the relevant market" of the
merging firms. 1 17 This involves focusing in on the merging firms' product and geographic market. 1 18 The second element of antitrust merger
analysis involves estimating the merger companies' potency in the respective markets. 119 The third factor for an antitrust merger inquiry in120
volves examining certain "industry- and transaction-specific factors."
Prongs 1 and 2 of the test involve an almost exclusive economic assessment of the proposed merger. 12 1 Prong 1 involves determining the prod22
uct category and geographic area in which the merging firm operates. 1
Prong 2 involves calculation of other economic factors such as market
shares and market concentration.' 23 What is most troubling about current Section 7 merger analysis is that Prong 3 is examined from an eco12 4
nomic approach as well.
c.

The Hart-Scott-RodinoAct

The Hart-Scott-RodinoAntitrust Improvement Act of 1976,125 among
other things, 126 requires merging companies to provide pre-merger notification to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") of their intention to merge if
the proposed merger falls within certain parameters. 1 27 Those parameters are: 1) that at least one of the two firms involved must have assets
or net sales of $100 million or more; and 2) the acquiring firm foresee
holding either $15 million or 15 percent of the acquired company's
28
assets.1
2. Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
United States antitrust law is primarily concerned with the types of
mergers and acquisitions that could potentially lessen competition and
place a small number of people or companies in control of a certain mar116. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 805 (discussing subsequent cases interpreting Brown
Shoe).

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 805-14.
122. Id. at 805-10.
123. Id. at 810-14.
124. Id. at 814-19.
125. 15 U.S.C. §16(a) (1976).
126. See 15 U.S.C. §18(a) (giving the FTC and the DOJ independent merger review
authority).
127. Arquit, supra n. 85, at 323.
128. Shumadine, supra n. 98, at 306.
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ket. 129 Enforcement of the antitrust laws is handled primarily by the
FTC and the DOJ. 130 With regard to media mergers, the FCC also has
review authority under the Communications Act of 1934 and Section

7.131 However a private party can bring a cause of action against another corporation for alleged monopolistic trade practices.1 32 Even after
the government has approved a merger, a private party may still bring a
cause of action against a proposed merger.' 3 3 If a court, the FTC, or the
DOJ finds a violation of the antitrust laws, it may issue an injunction
against the company seeking the merger and order an immediate sell-off
of stock and assets held in the other corporation.13 4 Courts may also
5
impose civil and criminal penalties in certain situations. 13
C.

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF

1996

The Telecom Act was the first major rewrite of the nation's telecommunications 13 6 laws since the Communications Act of 1934.137 It was

signed into law on February 8, 1996138 with the promise of opening up
every sector of the telecommunications industry to healthy competi129. See Panel II, supra 40, at 465. (discussing freedom of the press and antitrust
merger analysis).
130. The DOJ and the FTC have joint authority to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1994) (granting enforcement power to the DOJ). See id. at § 21(a)
(granting enforcement power to the FTC).
131. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1934) (requiring new communication technology to serve the
public interest, necessity and convenience); see 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (1934) (discussing the
FCC public interest standard). "The [FCC] shall seek to promote the [ I diversity of media
voices, vigorous economic competition, technological advancement, and promotion of the
public interest, convenience, and necessity." Id.
132. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 802. See e.g. L.A. Memorial Coliseum Commn. v. Natl.
Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
133. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 802. See e.g. CableAmerica Corp. v. FTC, 795 F. Supp.
1082, 1086 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) (granting the FTC power to order a person or corporation to
divest assets and/or stock acquired in violation of Section 7).
135. Shumadine, supra n. 98, at 306. Penalties can include fines and imprisonment. Id.
at 39. Individual states may also bring civil suits for damages. Id. at 42. Some state antitrust laws provide for the dissolution of a domestic corporation or the ouster of an out-ofstate corporation upon the conviction of state antitrust violations. Id. at 46-47. Private
litigants may bring suit for treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees. Id. at 44.
136. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (1996). "Telecommunications" is defined as "the transmission
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without changing in form or content the information as sent and received. Id.
137. Panel II, supra n. 40, at 465. The Telecom Act was essentially a rewrite if the
CommunicationsAct of 1934. Id.; see also 1 1 <http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html> (accessed
Apr. 25, 2002). The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC and gave it the authority to supervise communications in the United States. Id.
138. Deonne L. Bruning, The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996: The Challenge of Competition, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 1255 (1997).
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tion. 1 39 President Clinton, during the signing of the Telecom Act, said,
"[tioday, with the stroke of a pen, our laws catch up with our future. We
will help to create an open marketplace where competition and innovation can move as quick as light." 140 It is considered by some to be one of
14 1
the top three or four federal laws enacted in recent years.
The Telecom Act relaxed greatly or eliminated all together many
longstanding regulations, 14 2 most of which were passed more than a half
century ago and now thought to be a hindrance on the industry. 143 The
Telecom Act deregulates much of the telecommunications and media industries1 4 4 "[tlo promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications customers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." 145 Despite the Telecom Act's new reliance on
competition over telecommunications regulation, it explicitly reaffirmed
the FCC's role in promoting the "public interest."1 4 6 The Telecom Act
147
also explicitly reaffirmed antitrust law's role in media merger review.
The Telecom Act, inter alia, scaled back many television ownership
regulations. 148 First, it all but eliminates governmental restrictions on
the amount of television stations a person or corporation may "directly or
indirectly own, operate, or control, or have a cognizable interest in nationwide.' 4 9 Second, the Telecom Act waives the government's One-to139. Id.
140. Id. President Clinton also stated:
This landmark legislation fulfills my Administration's promise to reform our telecommunications laws in a manner that leads to competition and private investment, promotes universal service and open access to information networks, and
provides for flexible government regulation. The [Telecom] Act opens up competition between local telephone companies, long distance providers and cable companies; expands the reach of advanced telecommunications services to schools,
libraries, and hospitals; and requires the use of new V-chip technology to enable
families to exercise greater control over the television programming that comes
into their homes.
Robert M. Frieden, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Predicting the Winners and
Losers, 20 Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. 11 n. 9 (1997).
141. McChesney, supra n. 13, at 42.
142. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 847.
143. Cf Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 Fed. Comm.
L.J. 1, 9 (Nov. 1996).
144. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 847.
145. Telecom Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
146. 47 U.S.C. § 257(b).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1). The Telecom Act provides that "nothing in this Act... shall
be construed to modify, impair, or supercede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws."
Id.
148. See Symposium, Panel III: Implications of the New Telecommunications Legislation, 6 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 517, 520 (Spring 1996) [hereinafter Panel
III]. See also Nesvold, supra, n. 11, at 848.
149. 47 U.S.C. § 336(c)(1)(A) (regarding national ownership limitations).
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a-Market rule in the top 50 media markets. 150 The One-to-a-Market regulation prevented cross-ownership of television and radio stations in the
same market. 15 1 Third, the Telecom Act raises from 25 percent to 35
percent the amount of national viewers that a group of television stations under the same ownership can serve. 1 52 Fourth, the Telecom Act
orders the FCC to reconsider its multiple ownership rules in general,
which limit the ownership of more than one television station in a local
market. 1 53 Finally, the Telecom Act directs the FCC to change its rules
regarding so-called dual networks. 154 This change now permits a television station to affiliate with a person or corporation, who owns or controls two or more networks, except when those dual or multiple networks
are composed of: (1) two or more of the four existing networks (ABC,
CBS, NBC, and Fox) or, (2) any of the four existing networks and one of
the emerging networks, such as the Warner Brothers Television Net15 5
work or United Paramount Network.
With regard to radio ownership, the Telecom Act abolishes all the
government's rules limiting the number of FM or AM stations that one
person or corporation may own or operate. 15 6 Before passage of the
Telecom Act, a person or company could only possess twenty AM stations
and twenty FM stations nationwide.15 7 Under the Telecom Act, one person or corporation may now own up to and including five radio stations
or fifty percent of the total number of stations, whichever is less, in
smaller markets of 0-14 stations. 15 s In markets having fifteen to
twenty-nine radio stations, one person or corporation may own up to six
150. 47 U.S.C. § 336(d).
151. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 848.
152. 47 U.S.C. § 336(c)(1)(B) (regarding national ownership percentage limitations).
This provision was challenged recently on constitutional grounds. See Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (2002). The FCC is required to review each of its ownership
rules every two years. 47 U.S.C. § 336(h) (1996). "The Commission shall repeal of modify
any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest." Id. Fox Television
Stations arose out of the FCC's decision not to repeal or modify 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) or
The National Television and Station Ownership Rule ("NTSO"), and 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a)
or The Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule ("CBCO"). Id. at 1034. The FCC's reasoning behind retaining the rules was essentially to promote competition in the industry and
help safeguard diversity. Id. at 1036. The court called both rules "arbitrary" and "capricious." Id. at 1047-49. The court vacated the NTSO and instructed the FCC to modify the
NTSO consistent with the opinion. Id. at 1053. The court also vacated the CBCO and
ordered the FCC to repeal the rule. Id.
153. 47 U.S.C. § 336(c)(2) (concerning local television ownership limitations).
154. 47 U.S.C. § 336(e)(1).
155. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 849.
156. 47 U.S.C. § 336(a).
157. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1995).
158. 47 U.S.C. § 336(b)(1)(D).
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stations.1 5 9 Markets with thirty to forty-four radio stations, one company may own or operate seven stations. 160 Finally, large markets,
where there are more than forty-five radio stations operating, one person
161
or corporation may own up to eight stations.
In relation to multimedia companies, the Telecom Act affords them
62
the opportunity to offer multiple services that were once forbidden.'
The Telecom Act abolishes cross-ownership restrictions of cable systems. 1 63 It does this by allowing one person or business to own or operate both a cable system and a network of television stations.164 Also, a
typical telephone company can now offer many more services and fea65
tures than it did just a few years ago.'
The Telecom Act also contained a section called the Communications
Decency Act, ("CDA"), i 6 6 a controversial provision aimed at restricting
67
access by minors to indecent material, particularly over the Internet.
168
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU,
held the
CDA to be unconstitutional because it violated First Amendment as an
impermissible broad suppression of free speech. 1 69 Justice Stevens, in
adopting the words of the lower court, said that the CDA "sweeps more
70
broadly than necessary and thereby chills the expression of adults."
"'[Riegardless of the strength the government's interest' in protecting
children, '[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox."" 7 ' The CDA fell
prey to a long line of Supreme Court cases mandating that any content159. Id. § 336(b)(1)(C) (regulating markets with fifteen to twenty-nine radio stations,
where one person or corporation may own up to six stations).
160. Id. § 336(b)(1)(B) (regulating markets of thirty to forty-five radio stations, where
one company may own or operate seven stations).
161. Id. § 336(b)(1)(A) (regulating markets where there are more than forty-five radio
stations operating, where one person or corporation may own up to eight stations).
162. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 851.
163. See id. at 848.
164. 47 U.S.C. § 336(f)(1) (regarding elimination of restrictions on cable cross
ownership).
165. Catherine Arnst and Peter Burrows, U.S. West's Gauntlet Won't Just Lie There,
Bus. Wk. 32 (Mar. 11, 1996).
166. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a, d).
167. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). "[Tlhe purpose of the [Communications
Decency Act] is to protect children from the primary effect of"indecent" and "patently offensive" speech, rather than any "secondary" effect on such. Id. The "indecent transmission"
made unlawful for someone to knowingly transmit an obscene message to minors. 47
U.S.C. § 223(a). The "patently offensive display" provision prohibits a person from knowingly displaying offensive message to minors. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
168. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
169. Id. at 844.
170. Id. at 862.
171. Id. at 875 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75
(1983)).
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based regulation of free speech must be "narrowly tailored" to "a compel1 72
ling government interest."
III.

ANALYSIS

Media mergers place a small number of conglomerates in control of
the marketplace of ideas. 17 3 In an effort to bring this media merger
frenzy under control, the government should employ increased regulatory scrutiny towards proposed media mergers. Regulatory agencies
should apply a more aggressive antitrust model specifically tailored for
the media. This new model should take into consideration social and political interests as well as traditional economic concerns. The Telecom
Act should be amended to reinstate certain anti-concentration and market-share provisions. Finally, the FCC, armed with its public interest
directive 174 and expertise in media-related issues, can play a crucial role
17 5
in evaluating the possible affects of proposed media mergers.
A.

ANNOTATING THE NEWS: CORPORATE CONVERGENCE
AND JOURNALISM

The recent wave of media mergers has enormous implications for the
marketplace of ideas. These corporations, with their far-flung interests
and elaborate news operations, have the potential to exert an enormous
amount of control over the discourse of this country.' 76 Because these
172. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union: Supreme Court Strikes Down Portions of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 as Facially Overbroad Violation of the First
Amendment, 24 J. Contemp. L. 111, 130 (1998).
173. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 680.
174. 47 U.S.C. § 257(b).
175. Feld, supra n. 23, at 20 (discussing the need for the FCC to become for involved in
the media merger review process).
176. Jim Parker, The CBS-Viacom Merger: Impact on Journalism, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J.
519, 523 (May 2000) (discussing the overall effects of news content manipulation by "corporate controllers"). "[Liarge "corporate controllers" employ a significant amount of"manipulation of and interference in news content in pursuit of their own corporate self-interest."
Id.; see Norman Horowitz, Commentary: Perspective on the Media, L.A. Times B5 (Jan. 3,
2000) (available in 2000 WL 2197158) (discussing the proliferation of media mergers and
the political power these corporate unions represent). "Forget campaign finance reform.
The truth is, there is no more pervasive influence in our future elections than the likes of
RedstonefViacom/CBS, LevinfTime-Warneriturner, Eisner/Disney/ABC, Murdoch/News
CorpJFox ... Our nation could speak with many voices, but regrettably, it doesn't." Id.
Mr. Horowitz goes on to pose the following:
Ask yourself this: Is it a good idea for Rupert Murdoch to control the Fox Network,
15 TV stations, Fox News, Fox Sports, Fox Family Channel, 20th Century Fox,
Fox Animation, Fox Searchlight, the New York Post, the Times of London,
HarperCollins, the Weekly Standard, Mushroom Records, and much more?
Is it a good idea for Time-Warmer Chairman Gerald Levin to control the WB Network, HBO, TNT, TBS, CNN, CNNfn, CNNsi, Cinemax, Warner Bros., New Line
Cinema, Hanna-Barbera, Castle Rock, Time, People, Sports Illustrated, Fortune,
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companies are so vast, and so much a part of the political and social landscape of this country, it is likely that they themselves will grab headlines
for good and bad reasons. With so much control over the marketplace of
ideas, and the immense financial and synergistic forces at play, the issue
becomes whether these telecom giants will always allow their news operations to report stories critical of the parent company. Behold the potential for self-censorship, news coverage reduction, and news content
manipulation.
1.

The Case for Media Mergers

Proponents charge that media mergers can have a positive effect on
journalism and the marketplace of ideas. 177 Big media conglomerates
allow news outlets to be less beholden to local advertisers and government official, thus allowing for journalistic independence. 178 For example, local news operations may run into trouble airing stories that
present car dealers, a major source of ad revenue, in a bad light. 1 79 "A
small town editor who attacks his publisher's pal, the mayor, can be in
deep trouble, whereas big media can often tweak the powerful, and be
resilient enough to withstand retribution."'8 0
Big media proponents claim that corporate convergence has helped
bolster news operations in other ways as well. 181 "We've helped bankrupt stations get back on their feet and cover their cities and markets,"
says Charles Sennet, senior counsel for the Tribune Company.' 8 2 "We
offer an enhancement of coverage, better information at a quicker
rate."183 And becoming part of a larger news organization helps boost
28 other magazines, Warner Books, Little Brown, Warner Bros. Records, Atlantic,
Elektra, Sire, Rhino, Time Warner Cable, and much more?
Is it a good idea for Disney's Michael Eisner to control ABC-TV and ABC Radio, 10
TV and 30 radio stations, ESPN, Disney Channel, A&E, E!, Lifetime, Miramax,
Walt Disney Pictures, Touchstone Pictures, Hollywood Pictures, Hyperion Press,
ESPN Magazine, Walt Disney Records, Lyric Street Records, the Go Network of
Internet sites, and much more?
Is it a good idea for CBS' Sumner Redstone to control Infinity Broadcasting (163
stations), 34 TV stations, UPN, MTV, TNN, Nickelodeon, Showtime, Paramount
Pictures, Paramount TV, Spelling Television, Simon & Schuster, Blockbuster
videos, SportsLine, and much more?

Id.
7 <http://www.slate.msn.com/de177. See e.g. Jack Shafer, Big is Beautiful, Slate
fault.aspx? id+1004374> (accessed Nov. 27, 2001).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Hickey, Coping, supra n. 20, at 13.
181. See e.g. Telephone interview with Charles Sennet, Senior Counsel, Tribune Co.
(Dec. 4, 2001) (transcript on file with author).
182. Id
183. Id.
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the credibility of smaller operations. 184 Say you are a reporter with a
small town newspaper and it is likely no one in Washington will care, but
say you are a reporter with the New York Times or the Associated Press
18 5
and heads will turn.
In response to critics' charges that the media has too much control
over the marketplace of ideas, merger proponents claim that there are
still sufficient numbers of independent and alternative sources for news
and views. 1 86 What NBC will not cover, CBS and ABC will. 18 7 Sennet
agrees that there is enough competition with the Internet, independent
newspapers, and radio, "lilt's not like the Microsoft problem. I don't
think you could possibly have that much control in the media."18 8
2.

The Case Against Media Mergers

In all the supposed benefits that big media may offer the marketplace of ideas, the incidents of self-censorship, news coverage reduction,
and content manipulation outweigh the benefits. However, examples are
rare. There are few documented "smoking guns." 1 8 9 "The decision to
avoid a story or issue is almost never put down in memo form." 190 Instead, these decisions are made in editorial meetings, on staff assignment boards, and by the journalists themselves, out of fear of some kind
of retribution. 191
a.

A Survey of Conflicts

In 2000, the Columbia Journalism Review and the Pew Center for
the People and the Press surveyed journalists around the country on the
problems brought forth by corporate convergence. 192 The study found
that nearly twenty-five percent of journalists surveyed have at one time
or another avoided pursuing a newsworthy story. 1 9 3 About thirty percent said that some stories are ignored because of potential financial conflicts with advertisers or their news operations. 19 4 Of the investigative
184. Jack Shafer, supra n. 177, at
11.
185. Id.
186. Parker, supra n. 176, at 528.
187. Id.
188. Telephone interview, supra n. 181.
189. Mark Lowenthal, Smoke, Mirrors, and Censorship, Albion Monitor
2 <http:ll
www. monitor.net/monitor/10-30-95/ml-smoke.html> (Feb. 4, 2002).
190. Id.
191. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 682. Many reporters fear retribution if they cover a story
that presents the parent company in a bad light. Id.
192. Kohut, supra n. 15, at 5.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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reporters surveyed, 195 sixty-one percent believe parent companies exert
influence on story selection.19 6 Another survey conducted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors revealed that thirty-three percent of
editors said they would not be able to publish a story that was critical of
their respective parent companies. 19 7 These numbers evidence an
alarming trend that necessitates government intervention through increased merger scrutiny, amendments to the Telecom Act, and greater
FCC involvement.
b.

Staff Reductions

Merged media companies are under tremendous pressure to succeed
and to make money for company stakeholders. 1 98 In order to turn big
revenues, corporations that own news organizations reduce the number
of journalists they have on the payroll. 199 After the AOL/Time-Warner
merger, four hundred employees at CNN, ten percent of its workforce,
fell prey to corporate downsizing. 20 0 Around two hundred employees
will loose their jobs at CNN/SI when it ceases operations in May 2002.201
DrKoop.com, another AOL/Time-Warner news property, may also be
eliminated in 2002.202 "To do effective journalism is expensive, and corporate managers realize that the surest way to fatten profits is to fire
editors and reporters and fill the news hole with [ ] fluff... The takeover
of media organizations by conglomerates has caused the 'death of journalism.'" 20 3 This trend of downsizing will no doubt continue. Indepen195. Id. The investigative reporters surveyed are members of the Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc. Id.
196. Id.
197. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 682 (citing a study by the American Society of Newspaper
Editors). As companies grow larger and are present in an array of areas, the more likely
the news organization of that particular company will come upon a story involving that
company. Id. "One the problems of supergiants involved in the news is that supergiants
always have other interests that get into the news. The question is how they handle issues
and events in a way that ignore the fact that they control the news." Id. A great many
reporters fear retribution if they cover a story that paints the parent company in anything
less than a positive light. Id.
198. Interview: Mark Crispin Miller, supra n. 18, at TI4 (discussing the economic pressures placed upon media organization by company shareholders).
199. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 679 (discussing how strict profit motives will cause cutting
corners in news coverage). Local news department employ large numbers of journalists,
hence these departments are often the first place executives look to trim fat. Id.
200. Neil Hickey, CNN After The Merger, Columbia Journalism Rev. $ 1 <http://www.
cjr.org/year/01/4/cnnmerger.asp> (accessed Nov. 20, 2001).
201. Media Layoffs
1 <http://www.journalismjobs.com/layoffs.cfm> (accessed Apr. 10,
2002). This Web site contains a comprehensive list of media industry layoffs. See generally
id.
202. Id.
203. See McChesney, supra n. 13, at 25 (discussing the rash of layoffs and resignations
within the industry); see also Conrad, supra n. 19, at 682 (discussing how profit motives
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dent media organizations, on the other hand, have more journalists on
staff than organizations that are part of large media organizations. 20 4
Independent newspapers have an average of twenty-three percent more
local and national news than publications controlled by large media
organizations.205
c.

Examples of Self-Censorship, News Coverage Reduction, and
Content Manipulation

The examples that have come to light show just how insidious selfimposed media censorship and content manipulation can be. In 1993,
ABC contracted the Emmy Award-winning documentarians Frank and
Martin Koughan to do an expos6 on the tobacco industry for the ABC
program Turning Point.20 6 Things seemed to be going fine until March
1994 when, according to Martin Koughan, ABC started getting nervous. 20 7 He claims that the film had already been approved by both
ABC's editorial and law departments, and was scheduled to air when a
Turning Point producer called saying that the show would have to be
"reworked." 208 It seems in the intervening time, ABC was hit with a $10
billion libel suit by Philip Morris. 20 9 ABC claimed that the program was
"redundant" and "boring."2 10 ABC never aired the documentary. 2 1 1 But
what is perhaps most interesting is that ABC paid all the production
costs ($500,000), and retained all the rights to the film. 2 12 A film they
claimed was "boring."2 13 Was this a cave to the tobacco industry?
Another blow to ABC's integrity came in 1998.214 After assurances
by Disney executives that news operations at its then newly acquired
ABC News would remain intact, there was a major setback. 215 Brian
Ross was investigating a story about pedophiles that may have worked
have forced major job cuts in many large news organizations resulting in a reduction of
substantive local and national news).
204. Id.
205. Maura Christopher, How Profits Shapes News Companies and the News, Scholastic
Update 10 (Apr. 26, 1985).
206. Lowenthal, supra n. 189, at 915.
207. Id. at
6-7.
208. Id. at 918.
209. Id. at T 7.
210. Id. at 9113.
211. Id. at 9 12.
212. Id. at T9 11-12.
213. Id. at T113.
214. See Rifka Rosenwein, Why Media Mergers Matter T Synergy Snapshot (Dec. 1999/
Jan. 2000) (available at <http://www.brillscontent.com/features/mediamergers_1299.
html>).
215. Id.
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at Disney's Magic Kingdom in Florida. 2 16 His story never aired. 2 17 In
an interview with National Public Radio made only a few days before the
story was killed, Michael Eisner, chairman of Disney, said, "I would prefer ABC not to cover Disney... I think it's inappropriate for Disney to be
2 18
covered by Disney."
Another example of news coverage reduction and content manipulation involved NBC's the Today Show and a segment on consumer boycotts. 2 1 9 The program conveniently ignored a pending boycott of several
General Electric ("G.E.") products. 220 A guest on the segment claims he
was told not to speak of the boycott against G.E. products. 2 2 1 Lightening
appears to have struck twice in the same place because the Chair of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission lost her position as a Today Show
contributor when she tried to announce a recall of certain G.E.-manufac222
tured dishwashers on the popular morning program.
Examples of news coverage reduction and content manipulation include: ABC's Good Morning America devoting nearly an entire program
to Disney's 25th anniversary; 22 3 NBC trying to muscle its affiliates into
carrying the American League playoffs instead of the first Bush-Gore
presidential debate; 22 4 Time magazine placing Pokdmon on the cover to
promote its sister division's, Warner Brothers', release of Pokdmon: The
Movie;2 25 and NBC News executives being told not to use phrases like
216. Jonathon Alter, Big Media Gets Even Bigger, Newsweek 42 (Jan. 24 2000). Some
stories get killed because they are inaccurate, false, or would give rise to litigation. Id.
"The trouble with big media mergers [ I is that the public can never be sure of the answers
to such questions." Id.
217. See Parker, Journalism, supra n. 176, at 524; see Elizabeth Lesly, Commentary:
Self-Censorship is Still Censorship,Bus. Wk. 78 (Dec. 16, 1996) (available in WL 10771964)
(discussing that media and news organizations change their content to appease their parent companies).
218. See Rosenwein, supra n. 214, at 20 (quoting Disney's Michael Eisner). "[Bly and
large the way you avoid conflict of interest is to, as best as you can, not cover yourself." Id.
219. See Parker, Journalism, supra n. 176, at 523.
220. Id. at 524.
221. Id.
222. Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Viacom-CBS Merger: Media Competition and Consolidation in the New Millennium, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 513, 517-18 (May 2000).
223. See Parker, Journalism, supra n. 176, at 524.
224. Neil Hickey, Unshackling Big Media, Columbia Journalism Rev. 9119 <http:/!
www.cjr.org/year/01/4/fcchickey.asp> (Apr. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Hickey, Unshackling].
225. Hickey, Coping, supra n. 20, at 1 11. Another example of movie manipulation involved the Touchstone Pictures release, "Bad Company." See Bad Company-The Movie
<http://badcompany.movies.com> (accessed June 10, 2002). Touchstone Pictures, like
ABC, is a Disney property. Aaron Moore, Who Owns What: Disney, Columbia Journalism
Rev. § Movies <http'J/www.cjr.org/owners/disney.asp> (accessed June 10, 2002). Most major film critics gave the movie less that favorable reviews. See e.g. Roger Ebert, Current
Reviews: Bad Company, Chi. Sun-Times 1 1 (June 7, 2002) (available at <http'/
www.suntimes.com/output/ebertllwkp-news-bad07f.html>) (rating the film two stars out of
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"Black Monday" to describe the 1987 stock market crash because it de22 6
pressed G.E. stock.
Another major news story that was conspicuously absent from the
headlines was the passage of the Telecom Act. According to one study, in
the nine months between introduction of the Telecom bill in Congress
and the date it was signed into law, the big three networks spent a total
of nineteen and a half minutes on the Telecom Act. 2 2 7 One Washington
lobbyist commented that, "I've never seen anything like the Telecommunications Bill. The silence of public debate is deafening. A bill with such
228
astonishing impact on all of us is not even being discussed."
d.

What Needs to be Done

These examples demonstrate how much control big media corporation have over news and public affairs programming. How many important stories are killed that we will never hear about? Decisions are made
to kill stories or not discuss certain issues because they may not coincide
with corporate interests. "[I]t's not a question of mis-reporting. It's not a
question of false reporting. It's a question of not reporting." 22 9 Instead
a possible four); Lisa Schwarzbaum, Bad Company, Ent. Wkly. 1 1 (June 10, 2002) (available at http://www.ew.com/ew/article/review/movie/0,6115,259831-1-0-badcompany,00.
html) (grading the film at a B minus); David Elliot, Going From 'Bad Company' to Worse,
MSNBC.com <http:www.msnbc.com/news/761874. asp?Odm+V31AL> (accessed June 10,
2002) (calling the film "a bad action thriller"). On the other hand, Joel Siegal, film critic for
ABC's Good Morning America gave the film an excellent rating. Good Morning America
(ABC June 7, 2002) (tv broadcast). Siegal did not disclose that Disney was the parent company of both ABC and Touchstone Pictures. Id. On that same day, Anthony Hopkins and
Chris Rock, the film's two lead actors, appeared on The View to promote the film. The View
(ABC June 7, 2002) (tv broadcast). It seems suspect that Disney would give a favorable
review to a film in which the company had financial stake.
226. See Parker, Journalism,supra n. 176, at 524.
227. Rosenwein, supra n. 214, at 12. The study was conducted between when the bill
was introduced in May 1995, and its passage on February 1, 1996. Id.
228. McChesney, supra n. 13, at 43 (quoting Lobbyist Charles Bien, also discussing the
lack of public debate over the Telecom Act). The public debate over the Telecom Act was
virtually non-existent. Id. A robust public debate necessitates an informed citizenry. Id.
And, of course how does that citizenry get informed? "Only through the news media, where
news coverage is minimal and restricted to the range of legitimate debate, which, in this
case, means almost no debate at all. Id. The news media was simply not reporting on this
bill. Id. "[The Telecom Act] was covered (rather extensively) as a business story, not a
public policy story." Id.
229. Rosenwein, supra n. 214, at
9 (quoting Andrew Jay Schwartzman, president of
the Media Access Group); see Media Access Project <http://www.mediaaccess.org> (accessed Apr. 16, 2002). The Media Access Group "is a non-profit, public interest law firm
which promotes the public's First Amendment right to hear and be heard on the electronic
media of today and tomorrow." Id. See also Lande, Statement, supra n. 20, at 25. "When
a reader or viewer never learns about news events or particular editorial perspectives, he
or she might not look to other sources for them. The readers or viewers often would have
no reason to suspect that they have been deprived of a diversity of choices." Id.
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of introducing the stories or issues into the marketplace of ideas to let
the public determine their importance, the media gatekeepers filter
them out. As a substitute, the media allows a barrage of mindless celebrity "news," sensationalism, and the ubiquitous water skiing squirrel
story. 230 These are the reasons why each and every proposed media
merger should receive antitrust scrutiny that takes social and political
concerns into consideration, the Telecom Act, after its failure at sparking
meaningful competition, should be amended to not allow further consolidation in the industry, and the FCC should continue to maintain its
"public interest" standard for merger review.
B.

ANTITRUST LAW AS A REMEDY TO CURB MEDIA MERGERS

The media plays an essential role in the dissemination of ideas and
hence, the promotion of democracy. 23 1 Because of this important gatekeeper function, mergers that involve media companies demand a more
aggressive antitrust examination. The danger with large media marriages that place a small number of companies in control of the marketplace of ideas is not simply an increase in the subscription rate of one's
favorite magazine or a cable rate hike, it is the gentile, often unnoticed
2 32
shift in editorial viewpoints, and news coverage.
Historically, United States antitrust regulation has been based primarily on economic factors. 2 33 For a new antitrust model to be effectively applied to media, it must take into consideration more than just
the economic aspects of a proposed media merger. It must also regard
the social and political aspects of each perspective media merger. The
aim of antitrust law is to not only protect consumers from unfair prices
increases, but also, and perhaps most importantly, protect consumer
choice. 234 Consumers should be free to make choices by any criteria they
230. See e.g. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 679 (discussing how strict profit motives will cause
cutting corners in news coverage). "Walter Cronkite, legendary anchor of CBS Evening
News for eighteen years, recently criticized CBS News for bumping important stories and
relying on more entertaining ones." Id.
231. Wellstone, supra n. 3, at 551 (discussing the important role that mass media play
in the dissemination of ideas and opinions).
232. See Lande, Statement, supran. 20, at 4. "Communications media compete in part
by offering independent editorial viewpoints and an independent gatekeeper function. Six
media firms cannot effectively respond to a demand for choice or diversity competition." Id.
"If AOLfTime Warner goes through, copycat media mergers are certainly likely. A traditional concern of merger enforcement is whether the merger being evaluated is likely to
spark a trend to consolidation in the effected industry." Id. Media companies like Yahoo!,
Microsoft, and Viacom are all wondering if they should jump on the media merger band
wagon or get left behind by the AOL/rime Warner merger. Id.
233. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 677.
234. Lande, Consumer Choice, supra n. 87, at 503. It seems the Supreme Court agrees.
See e.g. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 n. 5 (1998)
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chose: quality, price, or as in the case of media organizations, by viewpoint diversity.2 35 The federal government, through well-promulgated
antitrust law, can be the guardian that protects the public from the gentile takeover of democracy by these telecommunications giants.
1. Antitrust Law and the First Amendment: The Two Can Co-Exist
At first blush, it would seem that any kind of governmental intervention in the marketplace of ideas might raise constitutional eyebrows
as impermissible, content-based regulation. However, significant Supreme Court cases, legislative history, and commentary from a former
influential antitrust regulator suggest that First Amendment values can
actually be enhanced by antitrust scrutiny.
a.

Significant Supreme Court Cases

In Associated Press v. U.S.,236 the Supreme Court recognized that
"[the First Amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a
free society."23 7 Associated Press involved alleged trade restraints by the
news organization. 238 The Associated Press ("AP") was accused of placing unfair restrictions on new members joining the organization, and
placing restraints on members' dealings with non-members. 2 39 In stating that First Amendment values coincide with antitrust scrutiny, Justice Black wrote, "[Ifreedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution,
but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not . . . The
First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention
that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity." 240 Further, in assessing AP's impact on the marketplace of ideas, the Court did not use the typical antitrust analysis
24 1
elements of defining the relevant market, price, market share, etc.
Instead, the majority recognized that AP's impact went beyond economic
(discussing that certain monopolistic practices "might deprive some consumers of a desired
product, eliminate quality competition, exclude rival producers, or facilitate oligopolistic
pricing"); FTC v. Indiana Fedn. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (stating that "an
agreement limiting consumer choice.. .cannot be sustained"); U.S. v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441, 455 (1964) (observing that "price is only one factor in a user's choice").
235. Lande, Consumer Choice, supra n. 87, at 503.
236. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
237. Id. at 20.
238. Id. at 4.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 20.
241. Id. at 17 (stating even though "an agreement to restrain trade does not inhibit
competition in all of the objects of that trade cannot save it from the condemnation of the
Sherman Act").
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concerns. Justice Frankfurter wrote, "[t]ruth and understanding are not
wares like peanuts or potatoes. And so, the incidence of restraints upon
the promotion of truth ... calls into play considerations very different
from comparable restraints in a cooperative enterprise having merely a
242
commercial aspect."
In 1994, in Turner BroadcastingSystem v. FCC,2 4 3 the Court held
that "[tihe government has an interest in 'eliminating restraints on fair
competition ... even when the individuals or entities subject to particular regulations are engaged in expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment.'" 24 4 Although Turner Broadcasting did not involve antitrust law directly, many of the same concerns raised in Associated Press
came to light once again. The case involved the constitutionality of certain "must-carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and CompetitionAct of 1992 (the "Cable Act"). 24 5 Sections 4 and 5 of the
Cable Act required cable operators to set aside a certain number of chan24 7
nels for local commercial 2 46 and non-commercial broadcast stations.
In up-holding the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act, once again the
Court recognized the appropriateness of antitrust scrutiny to the marketplace of ideas. Justice Kennedy wrote, "assuring that the public has
access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose
248
of the highest order."
b.

Legislative history

The legislative history of both the Celler-Kefauver Amendments to
Section 7 and the Telecom Act support antitrust scrutiny of the marketplace of ideas, and support such review beyond traditional economic concerns. 24 9 Media mergers are reviewed primarily under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 250 Section 7 is concerned with regulating the kind of mergers that tend to impede competition, 2 5 1 and place a person, company, or
242. Id. at 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
243. 520 U.S. 180 (1994).
244. Id. at 190. "Congress has long favored preserving a multiplicity of broadcast outlets regardless of whether the conduct... rises to the level of an antitrust violation." Id.
245. Id. at 180. The legislative history of the Cable Act illustrates Congress's concern
for merging media. S. Rep. No. 102-92, at 32-33 (1991), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1165-66. One
such concern was that "the media gatekeepers will (1) slant information according to their
own biases, or (2) provide no outlet for unorthodox or unpopular speech because it does not
sell well, or both." Id.
246. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(1)(B), 534(h)(1)(B).
247. 47 U.S.C. § 535(a).
248. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 181.
249. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
Antitrust L.J. 249, 273 (2001).
250. Arquit, supra n. 85, at 323.
251. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 801.
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a small group of companies in control of market segment which enables
them to maintain a monopoly. 25 2 In debating the scope of the new
amendments, members of the House discussed potential harm to the
25 3
marketplace of ideas through mergers in the newspaper industry.
"[Tihere should be preclusion of merging one newspaper with another
where the effect would be only one newspaper," said the amendment's
sponsor, Rep. Emanuel Celler. 254 "In any community there should be
clash of opinion. We should not have opinion all one-sided. There should
25 5
be both sides submitted to the populace."
As mentioned earlier, the Telecom Act was intended to increase competition through elimination of certain regulatory barriers. 25 6 Deregulation notwithstanding, Congress still intended the marketplace of ideas to
come under continued antitrust review. Senator Howard Metzenbaum
remarked that, "federal and state regulation of the telecommunications
industry has been and will continue to be a poor substitute for aggressive
antitrust review." 25 7 Congressman John Conyers noted in the Telecom
Act debates that, "[a]ntitrust law is synonymous with low prices and consumer protection, and that is exactly what we need in our telecommunications industry."2 58 This belief, of continued antitrust scrutiny
involving the marketplace of ideas, was expressly provided for in the
Telecom Act's "antitrust savings clause." 2 59 It provides that "nothing in
this Act ... shall be construed to modify, impair, or supercede the appli260
cability of any of the antitrust laws."
c.

Commentary

Former FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky agrees that not only
should antitrust law apply to the marketplace of ideas, but that antitrust
scrutiny should go beyond traditional economic analysis. "[Ilt is just bad
history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws." 2 61 "[A]ntitrust policy that failed to take
political concerns into account would be ... out of touch with the rough
political consensus that has supported antitrust enforcement for almost
252. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
253. Stucke, supra n. 249, at 260.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 847.
257. Stucke, supra n. 249, at 289.
258. 142 Cong. Rec. H1145 (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
259. Stucke, supra n. 249, at 289.
260. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(2) (1996).
261. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1051
(1979). Pitofsky further states that "[a]lthough economic concerns would remain paramount, to ignore these non-economic factors would be to ignore the bases of antitrust legislation and the political consensus by which antitrust has been supported." Id. at 1075.
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a century." 2 62 To do otherwise, says Mr. Pitofsky, will result in "too
26 3
much power in too few hands [impairing] freedom of expression."
The Associate Press and Turner Broadcastingcases, legislative history, and comments by an influential former government regulator suggest not only First Amendment values are enhanced by abtitrust
scrutiny, but that media merger review should go beyond traditional economic analysis. Because of the media's important gatekeeper function
within the marketplace of ideas, and its role in the promotion of democracy, antitrust review of media mergers should reflect those unique attributes and take into consideration the political and social ramification
of each proposed merger. The media industry is like no other, and so
consequently, antitrust law must regulate this industry like no other.
"This is not a mere commodity we're talking about. It's something more
2 64
fundamental-information in a democracy."
2.

A New, Media-Specific Antitrust Model is Needed

As mentioned earlier, vertical mergers within the telecommunications industry are not per se illegal. 26 5 They are instead scrutinized
under the "rule of reason" approach. 2 66 Since Brown Shoe, 2 6 7 a threepronged test for rule of reason merger analysis under Section 7 has developed. 2 68 It involves: (1) an identification of a market; (2) an estimate
of the degree of concentration in the market the proposed merger would
cause; and (3) weighing certain "industry- and transaction-specific factors."26 9 'What is most troubling about current Section 7 merger analysis
is that Prong 3 is examined from an economic approach as well. 2 70 How
can the free flow of information in a democracy be dependent upon
whether a proposed media merger is just merely economically efficient?
Admittedly, a bright-line standard for non-economic merger analysis
would be difficult to construct. Each merger affects the marketplace of
ideas in different ways. However, continuing the current economicallycentered antitrust paradigm, which allows mergers that dramatically reduce the number of independent news content suppliers, and simultane262. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 697.
263. See FTC Chief to Test Theory in Review of Turner Deal, Robert Pitofsky is Making it
Clear He Believes Media Mergers Deserve Special Scrutiny, supra n. 31, at $ 7.
264. Karl Taro Greenfeld, The CBS-Viacom Merger, TIME 48 (Sept. 20, 1999) (available
at 1999 WL 25725375).
265. Shumadine, supra n. 98, at 51.
266. Id.
267. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
268. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 805 (discussing subsequent cases interpreting Brown
Shoe).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 814-19.
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ously fails to raise regulators' eyebrows because those same mergers do
not lead to higher prices, must not be allowed. Non-economic factors,
such as diminished quality, reduced consumer choice, and the potential
for self-censorship must be taken into consideration by antitrust regulators. When a corporation approaches a near or total monopoly, beyond
price concerns, there is a danger that the company will become "the sole
271
voice in the marketplace, or worse, extra-governmental."
3.

Case Study: The AOL/Time-Warner Merger

Before approving the AOL/Time-Warner merger, antitrust regulators should have asked the question: "do we want one company, or a
small number of companies, to have this much control over the marketplace of ideas?" If the social and political aspects of the proposed media
merger were taken into consideration, perhaps the answer to that question might have been "no." So far, other than staff reductions, no incidents of self-censorship, news coverage, or news content manipulation
have surfaced. But with a corporation such as AOL/Time-Warner with
assets so vast, the potential for such behavior exists. The potential to
impede the dissemination of news and views should be of utmost concern
to antitrust regulators. Antitrust law allows for the examination of potential effects of a proposed merger. 2 72 The "reasonable probability"
standard under Section 7 gives regulators great latitude in the merger
review process. 2 73 Actual harm need not be proven. 274 Should not the
government's wide latitude include an assessment of the "reasonable
probability" of harm to the marketplace of ideas?
Prong 3 of Section 7 analysis allows for the examination of certain
"industry- and transaction-specific factors."2 75 Typically, these factors
are examined from an economic perspective. 27 6 However, to fully examine "industry- and transaction-specific factors" in the media industry,
non-economic factors, such as the continue independence of journalism
and the continued availability of alternative sources for news and public
affairs programming, must be taken into consideration in the merger review process.
Media giants have a great impact, not just on the economic wellbeing of this country, but on the social and political discourse of America.
Self-censorship, news coverage reduction, and news content manipula271. Panel I, supra n. 12, at 435. Mr. Pitofsky avers that political considerations must
come into play when a person, company or entity approaches monopoly status. Id.
272. Shumadine, supra n. 98, at 304.
273. Id. at 305.
274. Id. at 304.
275. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 805.
276. Id. at 814-19.
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tion have occurred. 2 77 As the number of media mergers increases, the
number of independent media organizations decreases. Antitrust analysis of media mergers should not merely focus on the economic aspects of
a particular proposed merger; it should go further and consider social
and political aspects as well. 2 78 If these non-economic concerns are not

taken into consideration by antitrust regulators, further harm to the
marketplace of ideas may continue. It is not the price of chewing gum or
bananas at stake here; it is the potential for a monopoly on the marketplace of ideas.
C.

THE

TELECOM Ac s

FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL COMPETITION

The Telecom Act was signed into law with the promise of opening up
every sector of the telecommunications industry to healthy competition. 2 79 Increased competition through deregulation would, at least in

theory, encourage the development of new technologies and ensure for
consumers lower prices and higher quality services. 28 0 Now, looking
back at the Telecom Act's first five plus years, it seems the consumer
benefits envisioned by Congress and President Clinton have failed to
28 1
materialize.
1.

The Telecom Act has Failed Its Primary Goal-Promoting
Competition

The passage of the Telecom Act was the impetus for today's media
merger trend. 28 2 The Telecom Act's rollback of many anti-concentration
277. See supra nn. 206-98 and accompanying text.
278. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 677. "Several factors indicate that antitrust law is poised
for a change that will directly effect the recent wave of media mergers. This new doctrine
should not rely solely on economic concerns but rather should also take into account both
social and political issues." Id.
279. Bruning, supra n. 138, at 1255.
280. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 847-48.
281. See Lessons From 1996 TelecommunicationsAct: Deregulation Before Meaningful
Competition Spells Consumer Disaster 1 1 <http://www.consumersunion.org/telecomnlessondc201.htm> (accessed Apr. 25, 2002) (discussing how meaningful competition has lessened and prices of services have slowly increased since the passage of the Telecom Act). In
general, cable TV and phone rates have not decreased. See Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media
Monopoly, xviii (Beacon Press, 2000). In some markets, the rates have increased. Id. Sen.
Russ Feingold of Wisconsin agrees that the Telecom Act has had a negative impact on the
telecommunications industry. See generally Sen. Russ Feingold, Statement of U.S. Senator
Russ Feingold on Market Concentration in the Radio, Concert, and Promotion Industries
<http://www.senate.gov/-feingold/releases/02/06/2002613529.html> (accessed June 25,
2002). "In just five year since its passage, the effects of the [Telecom Act] have been far
worse than we ever imagined." Id. at $ 6.
282. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 846 (discussing the effects of the passage of the
Telecom Act). The Telecom Act contributed "to the rise of media competition and consolida-

tion." Id.
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and market-share provisions enables the big to get bigger, and the small
to get, well, smaller. The biggest media mergers in history have occurred
since it's passing. 28 3 By scaling back or eliminating all together many
longstanding provisions intended to safeguard competition and diversity,
such as regulations concerning television 28 4 and radio ownership, 28 5 and
cross-ownership in multimedia companies, 28 6 the Telecom Act actually
encourages companies like AOL/Time-Warner and ViacomICBS to merge
because the restrictions on the amount of properties they may own or
control are virtually eliminated.
Instead of engaging in robust competition, as was the hope of the
Telecom Act, the large media cartels have elected to merge or form alliances, which actually impede competition and place market barriers to
smaller, independent companies. These smaller companies are either
forced out of business or face being gobbled up. Yet, the typical consumer would most likely be unaware of this because the number of available options may stay relatively the same. The problem is in the
reduction of the amount of different sources from which those options
come. If the idea behind promoting meaningful competition is to ultimately increase consumer choices but these media marriages actually
reduce the number of available choices for news, views, etc., then the
Telecom Act has clearly failed one of its primary goals. However, aggressive merger scrutiny by federal regulatory agencies, including the
FCC, 2 8 7 and reinstatement of the anti-concentration and market-share
provisions below, can help correct this problem.
2.

Congress Should Reinstate CertainAnti-Concentrationand MarketShare Regulations

Certain provisions of the Telecom Act have resulted in the exact opposite of their intended purpose. These rules should be repealed and the
former regulations reinstated in order to help turn back the tide of media
mergers and promote a multiplicity of voices and prevent concentrations
of power within the media industry. Congress should reinstate the Oneto-a-Market rule. 28 8 The Telecom Act waives the government's One-to-a283. See Viacom and CBS to Merge in Largest Media TransactionEver $ 1 <http://www.
viacom.com/press.tin?ixPressRelease=45001567> (accessed Apr. 25, 2002). This merger
held the $80 million record until the AOL/Time-Warner merger. See Saul Hansell, America
Online to Buy Time Warner for $165 Billion, N.Y. Times
1 <http://www.nytimes.com/
learning/students/ask reporters/articles/hansell-articlel.html> (accessed Apr. 25, 2002).
284. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 848.
285. Id.
286. 47 U.S.C. § 302 (allowing massive cable and television cross-ownership).
287. See Dean Alger, Megamedia, 234 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) (stating "[tihe
[Telecom Act] is fundamentally flawed, because unless you have extremely aggressive antitrust enforcement, this law cannot and will not promote competition").
288. 47 U.S.C. § 202(d).
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Market rule in the top fifty media markets. 28 9 This regulation prevented
290
cross-ownership of television and radio stations in the same market.
Congress needs to maintain or lower the national television ownership
rule back to twenty-five percent. 2 9 1 The Telecom Act raised the amount
of national viewers that a group of television stations under the same
ownership can serve to thirty-five percent. 2 92 Congress should maintain
the Dual Networks Rule. 2 9 3 Congress must reinstate rules regarding
nationwide radio station ownership. 294 Finally, Congress should also re29 5
consider eradication of cross-ownership restrictions on cable systems.
Congress should consider the above rule changes in order to help promote diversity and healthy competition within the media industry.

D.

THE

FCC

SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE MEDIA MERGER
REVIEW PROCESS

Since its inception in 1934, the FCC has been required to promote
the "diversity of media voices, vigorous economic competition, technological advancement, and . . . the public interest, convenience, and necessity."29 6 The agency accomplishes this directive through radio spectrum
allocation 2 97 and independent media merger review. 298 The mandated
289. Id.
290. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 848.
291. 47 U.S.C. § 336(c)(1)(B) (regarding national ownership percentage limitations).
292. Id.
293. 47 U.S.C. § 336(e)(1).
294. Id. § 336(a). Senator Russ Feingold has had his sights set particularly on radio
ownership concentration. See generally Sen. Russ Feingold, Feingold Introduces "Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act" <http://feingold.senate.gov/releases/02/06/
062702medcon.html> (accessed June 28, 2002). He recently introduced a bill aimed at
prohibiting certain anti-competitive practices in the radio and concert industries. Id. at
1-5. The Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act of 2002 (the "Competition Act")
calls for ending payola-like practices for song airplay, and opening up the radio and concert
industries to greater competition through increased local control and diversity. See generally Sen. 2691, 107th Cong. (2002). The Competition Act orders the FCC to revoke the
license of any radio station that uses its cross-ownership market power to discriminate
against musicians, concert promoters, or other radio stations. Id. § 3. It also prevents further relaxation of radio ownership limitations in local markets. Id. § 4. "Radio is one of the
most important mediums we have for exchanging ideas and expressing our creativity. I am
committed to fairness and competition and to ensuring that cross-ownership of promotion
services or venues is not used to hurt musicians, concert promoters, or other radio stations." See Feingold, Feingold Introduces, supra n. 294, at 1 1. "The [Telecom Act] opened
the floodgates for concentration in the radio and concert industry ... we need to repair the
damage that has been done through this anti-competitive behavior." Id. at 6.
295. See Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 848.
296. Id.
297. Feld, supra n. 23, at 21.
298. See James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the FCCand the Justice Department Over TelecommunicationsTransactions,6 Corn-
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public interest standard gives the FCC wide discretion in evaluating a
proposed merger. 29 9 The FCC may approve a merger or acquisition with
or without conditions, 30 0 or the agency may outright reject a proposed
merger it deems likely to be detrimental to the public interest. 30 1 If the
protection of the public interest is indeed an integral part of FCC policy,
then why has the agency seemingly disregarded its core objective to the
advantage of corporate interests? The explanation for this is two fold:
external political pressure and internal decision-making.
Recently, the FCC's merger review power has come under fire by
critics who claim it duplicates DOJ and FTC merger review functions
causing unnecessary expense and delay. 30 2 AT&T and MediaOne filed
their merger application with the FCC on July 7, 1999.303 The agency
planned to give the proposed merger "very careful scrutiny."30 4 On June
6, 2000, the FCC approved the merger, trailing DOJ approval by two
weeks. 30 5 For this two-week lag, Senator John McCain publicly admon30 6
ished the FCC as an agency "unable to lead or unwilling to follow."
Perhaps in response to this criticism, the agency kept a low profile during both the AOL/Time-Warner and Viacom/CBS merger review
30 7
proceedings.
The Bush-appointed majority, led by Michael K. Powell 308 and formLaw Conspectus 195, 197-98 (discussing the FCC's role in antitrust analysis of media
mergers).
299. Id. at 197. The FCC is "entrusted with responsibility to determine when and to
what extent the public interest would be served by competition in the industry." Id. at 19798 (quoting U.S. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). See Randolph J. May, The
Public Interest Standard:Is It Too Indeterminateto be Constitutional?,53 Fed. Comm. L.J.
427 (2001) (providing an interesting discussion on the public interest standard and the
delegation doctrine).
300. Feld, supra n. 23, at 20.

301. Id.
302. Id. at 20-21.
303. Id. at 24.
304. Brenda I. Koerner, Losing Signal, Mother Jones 40, 41 (Sept./Oct. 2001).
305. Feld, supra n. 23, at 24.
306. Koerner, supra n. 304, at 92. Senator McCain was at the time chair of the Senate
Commerce Committee, a body that reviews FCC nominations. Id. Two weeks after this
public denouncement of the FCC, McCain received a $10,000 presidential campaign contribution from AT&T. Id. AT&T edges out Viacom as McCain's third highest campaign contributor. Id. On another occasion, McCain stated that: "about the best you can say is that
the FCC is wasting valuable resources that could more productively be spent elsewhere.
But the real harm lies in the fact that the FCC is foisting needless burdens and restrictions
on the merging companies that translate into higher prices for consumers." Feld, supra n.
23, at 21.
307. See generally CBS-Viacom Merger Approved by FCC <http://tvschedules.ab...
dules/library/weekly/aao50400a.htm> (accessed Sept. 11, 2000) (discussing role of the FCC
during the Viacom/CBS merger review hearings).
308. Michael K. Powell is the son of Secretary of State Colin Powell. See Hickey, Unshackling, supra n. 222, at 2.
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mer US West (now Qwest Communications) lobbyist Kathleen Abernathy, has already rolled back, eliminated, or is considering the same for
many longstanding agency prohibitions. 30 9 Among those being rolled
back is the Dual Network Rule, which prohibits a single company from
owning more than one broadcast network. 3 10 The Commission waved
the Dual Networks Rule 3 11 to allow Viacom to keep an interest in UPN
after it acquired CBS. 3 12 Other rules under roll-back consideration are:
certain anti-concentration regulations, private sale of the publicly-owned
broadcast spectrum, and whether to allow commercial uses of location3 13
based services-technology used to track cell phone users.
Perhaps the most troubling change at the FCC is the agency's position in relation to its public interest objective. In April 2001, Chairman
Powell said before a meeting of the American Bar Association that the
agency's public interest standard "[was] about as empty a vessel as you
can accord a regulatory agency." 3 14 One observers agree stating that
"[tihe public interest standard which the FCC purports to apply to recent
communications mergers often fails to constitute any standard at all...
Moreover, if and when the Commission begins an extensive investigation, companies generally have no means by which to determine the substantive standard which will govern approval."3 15 Another finds the
public interest standard vague, out-of-date, and generally an improper
delegation of Congressional authority. 3 16
Congress and the Supreme Court, however, still recognize the FCC's
public interest standard as a viable, albeit inexact, guide for media
309. Koerner, supra n.304, at 42; see Hickey, Unshackling,supra n. 222, at 17. "News
departments get reduced, and culturally diverse and public interest programming comes
under pressure. Less popular programming disappears and journalists are evaluated by
the corporate-profit-center logic of these huge organizations. The new chairman of the FCC
doesn't care of whit about any of this stuff." Id. (quoting Mark Cooper, research director of
the Consumer Federation of America).
310. News Release: FCC Eliminates the Major Network/Emerging Network Merger Prohibition From Dual Network Rule 3 <httpJ/www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/NewsReleases/200L/nrmm0105.html> (accessed Oct. 5, 2001). The dual network rule had for

several years prohibited any of the four major broadcast networks, i.e., ABC, CBS, Fox, and
NBC from merging with one another or with a so-called "emerging" broadcast network, i.e.,
WB or UPN. 47 U.S.C. § 336(e)(1). The change now allows a major network to merge with
one of the emerging networks. Id.
311. Id.
312. Koerner, supra n. 304, at 42.
313. Id. at 44.
314. Id. at 42. Powell referred to the media corporations as "our clients" during his first
trip to Capitol Hill as FCC chairman. Id.
315. Daniel E. Troy, Advice to the New Presidenton the FCC and Communications Pol-

icy, 24, Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy, 503, 508-09 (2001).
316. See generally May, supra n. 299; see Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and Content
Regulation in Merging and Emerging Media, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 1009 (1996) (arguing that

the FCC's public interest standard is rarely helpful).
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merger analysis. Twice within the past decade, Congress has considered
modifying the FCC's merger review standard and each time backed
3 19
away. 317 In both the Cable Act, 3 18 and the more recent Telecom Act,
320
Congress explicitly reaffirmed the FCC's public interest directive.
The Supreme Court has on several occasions reviewed the malleability of
3 21
the standard and found it constitutional.
If the FCC were to have looked at the AOL/Time-Warner merger, for
example, from a public interest perspective, then the outcome of the
merger review process may have been quite different. Before giving
AOL/Time-Warner the green light, the FCC ordered the media giant to
take a few modest steps to open up its instant messaging service to rival
companies 3 22 and to make promises of ensuring consumers' continued
unfettered access to broadband technology. 3 23 Before approving the
Viacom and CBS merger, the Commission ordered a small divestiture of
several radio and television stations 32 4 to bring Viacom into compliance
with the thirty-five percent market share regulation. 32 5 The agency took
no further action. 32 6 Viacom was allowed to keep all of its original net3 27
works, and all of CBS's large production and distribution facilities.
For Viacom, the sale of a few broadcast holdings, or for AOL/TimeWarner, to open up its instant messaging service to competition, were
indeed small prices to pay to secure leadership positions atop the telecommunications industry. Employing tougher conditions and/or ordering divestiture of certain major assets would open the industry up to
greater competition and be more beneficial to the public both in price and
content. Instead the FCC, apparently giving in to political and corporate
317. Feld, supra n. 23, at 20.
318. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
319. 47 U.S.C. § 257(b).
320. Feld, supra n. 23, at 20.
321. See e.g. FCC v. RCA Commun., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953); U.S. v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 358 U.S. 334, 350-52 (1959).
322. The concern is that consumers who use the AOL ISP will then be forced to use
AOL's Instant Messaging service instead of one of their choosing. See AOL, Time Warner
Merger Clears Last Hurdle T 16 <http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/business/DailyNews/
aol-approval_ 010110.html> (accessed Jan. 13, 2001) (discussing the terms and conditions
of the FCC's approval of the AOL/Time-Warner merger).
323. See Aaron M. Wigod, The AOL-Time WarnerMerger: An Analysis of the Broadband
InternetAccess Market, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. Law 349, 363-66 (Summer 2002) (discussing both the FTC's and FCC's initial concerns over broadband access in a post-AOL/
Time-Warner merger marketplace).
324. Id.
325. 47 U.S.C. 336(c)(1)(B) (regarding national ownership limitations). Raising the national ownership limit from twenty-five percent to thirty-five percent. Id.
326. See generally CBS-Viacom MergerApproved by FCC, supra n. 307 (discussing role
of the FCC during the Viacom/CBS merger review hearings).
327. Id.
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pressure, gave its stamp of approval to both mergers without much
328
debate.
The FCC, in order to truly promulgate its public interest directive, 32 9 should look at the industry as a whole, and assess the potential
effects of a media merger, not just in the economic sense, but in social
and political arenas as well. This is the "true" public interest standard.
The FCC, as a federal agency with expertise in new and developing technology, is in a unique position to protect the public's First Amendment
right to "diverse and antagonistic sources of information" 3 30 and encourage meaningful competition 3 3 1 within the telecommunications industry.3 32 In keeping with these positive public interest values, the FCC
should only grant approval to media mergers that are in accordance with
these fundamental values. Bowing down to corporate and political pressure will only end up harming our democratic process and diminishing
the integrity of the First Amendment.
The telecommunications industry is certainly like no other. The special characteristics of this growing and expanding industry necessitate
the FCC's continued involvement in media merger review. The FCC's
versatile public interest standard is able to adapt to the changing needs
and concerns of the industry. The need for continued democratic discourse and healthy economic competition within the media industry far
33 3
outweighs the need for quick and efficient merger reviews.
E.

THE INTERNET IS NOT YET AN EFFECTIVE TOOL AGAINST THE

TELECOM TYRANTS

Finally, an observation about the Internet. Many claim that the In33 4
ternet has successfully circumvented the global corporate oligarchy
and become a successful voice for the disenfranchised. 3 35 Unfortunately,
this is not the case. An independent Web page is still no match for an
established news organization that operates highly-rated 24-hour cable
328. Id.
329. 47 U.S.C. § 257(b). To promote the "diversity of media voices, vigorous economic
competition, technological advancement, and ...the public interest, convenience, and necessity." Id.
330. Feld, supra n. 23, at 20.
331. By "meaningful competition" it is meant an industry with many production and
distribution facilities competing with one another in fair competition.
332. Weiss, supra n. 298, at 198.
333. Feld, supra n. 23, at 21.
334. Id. at 33 (discussing the Internet as another venue for mega-media marketing).
335. Id. In the early to mid-90s, when the Internet was coming into its own, the hope
was that the information superhighway would be able to bypass conventional media and
allow people around the world to communicate directly. Id. Unfortunately these expectations for a "new world order" have been dashed. Id. Instead, a "new world economy" has
prevailed. Id.
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and radio networks, 3 36 and has substantial Internet properties of its
own. Some Internet advocates claim all Web sites are on an equal footing with one another,33 7 but have they ever counted the number of times
a news operation's Web site is promoted during a particular newscast?
The media giants use the Internet as simply another vehicle for promotion and advertising revenue. 338 Their Web sites are chock full of advertising banners and so-called "news," which is essentially program
information presented in a news-type format.3 39 The myth that the Internet has created a new an effective avenue for the dissemination of
alternative or diverse news and views must be debunked. 3 40
IV.

CONCLUSION

The media plays an essential role in the promotion of democracy. 3 4 1
The media has a direct impact on what we see, hear, and think. 3 42 Ownership in a media organization can be a powerful tool that can easily be
misused. 34 3 Big media mergers pose a threat to our democracy because
these corporate unions block programming 3 44 and viewpoint diversity 3 4 5

and promote news and public affairs homogenization. 3 46 When large
corporations control the marketplace of ideas, the public interest takes a
336. Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 866.
337. McChesney, supra n. 13, at 33.
338. Id. See also Panel II, supran. 40, at 472 (discussing that eventually, like television
and other media, the Internet will be driven purely by marketplace forces, i.e., profit motives, value for shareholders, etc.).
339. McChesney, supra n. 13, at 34 (discussing how media organizations and advertisers have attempted to shape and mold the Internet according to their commercial whims).
340. Cf Nesvold, supra n. 11, at 866 (discussing that the public has not perceived the
Internet as an alternative source for news and views); see also McChesney, supra n. 13, at
34. The Internet is changing "from being a participatory medium that serves the interest
of the public to being a broadcast medium where corporations deliver consumer-oriented
information. Interactivity [is being] reduced to little more than sales transactions and
email." Id.
341. Wellstone, supra n. 3, at 551.
342. Conrad, supra n 19, at 698-99.
343. Id. at 699.
344. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 679 (discussing that the bringing of production and distribution outlets under one roof is just one of the many reasons why media firms consolidate).
345. Cf. Wellstone, supra n. 3, at 552 (discussing the overall effects that media consolidation has on diversity).
346. Eric Alterman, Big Media Is Not Always Better % 2 <http://www.Intellectualcapital.
com/issues/issue306/item6646.asp> (accessed Sept. 23, 2000) (quoting Mr. Alterman's opinion on the negative affect of media mergers on journalism). "The danger posed by all the
mega-mergers, like that of CBS and Viacom, is only partially the reduction in the diversity
of voices. No less worrisome is the likely homogenization of opinion all across the spectrum." Id.
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back seat to the goal of making large profits. 34 7 In order to turn those
big revenues, parent companies engage in self-censorship, news coverage
reduction, and news content manipulation. They also reduce the number
3 48
of journalists employed in their news departments.
Antitrust law can be an effective weapon against massive media corporate consolidation. 34 9 However, antitrust analysis of media mergers
should not merely focus on the economic aspects of a particular proposed
merger. 350 The federal regulatory agencies should also take into account
the social and political aspects of every proposed media deal. The Supreme Court on several occasions has stated that antitrust law should be
35 x
used to ensure access to diverse news and opinions.
The Telecom Act effectively ended over 60 years of federal communications law. 3 5 2 The Telecom Act, under the guise of enhancing competition, modified or eliminated many longstanding rules governing market
3 53
concentration and cross ownership of telecommunication companies.
By removing these concentration and ownership barriers, the Telecom
Act encourages media mergers, which in turn reduces the number of independent media organizations. 354 Therefore, the Telecom Act actually
helps big media organization stymie competition and diversity in the
marketplace of ideas. To reverse the ill effects of the Telecom Act, Congress should reinstate certain market-share and cross-ownership
347. Panel II, supra 40, at 472. (discussing freedom of the press and antitrust merger
analysis). The leading media outlets are increasingly under more pressure to make money.
Id. These pressures come externally from the marketplace, and internally from shareholders and executives. See also Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust
Perspective of Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 473, 477 (Mar.
2000) (discussing the affects of the Telecom Act not only on the radio industry, but the
media industry as a whole). Promoting competition and encouraging diversity is the true
definition of"public interest." Id. (paraphrasing Polices Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755,
22-23). Allowing media mergers to proliferate is in direct conflict to this initiative. Cf.
id. at 474.
348. Conrad, supra n. 19, at 682 (discussing how strict profit motives will cause cutting
corners in news coverage). Local news department employ large numbers of journalists,
hence this department is often the first place executives look to trim fat. Id. When regulators approved the Time-Warner/Turner Broadcasting merger, Ted Turner said, "[wle're going to cut millions of millions of dollars and, like Superman, we're going up, up and away,
in terms of ratings, magazine subscriptions [and] movie box-office share." Id. TimeWarner/Turner Broadcasting officials estimated that they would be cutting nearly 1,000
jobs after the merger. Id.
349. Cf id. at 683-85.
350. Id. at 677.
351. See supra no. 234-46 and accompanying text.
352. See generally Telecom Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
353. Cf id.
354. Cf. Nevsold, supra n. 11, at 846 (discussing the overall purpose behind the Telecom
Act). The Telecom Act "eliminat[es] regulatory barriers that block competition." Id. at 847.
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3 55

regulations.
Finally, the FCC, through its public interest directive, can also play
an important role in media merger analysis. The FCC, as an agency
with expertise in telecommunications issues, can effectively evaluate the
impact that a particular media merger will have on society. 3 56 The FCC
should rigorously resist further efforts by Congress to roll back regulatory barriers that protect diversity and competition in the marketplace of
ideas.
More media mergers will allow "too much power in too few hands
impair[ing] freedom of expression." 3 57 The Internet will not save us and
200 channels on the dial is not truly "diverse" programming. 358 The
words of former FCC Commissioner Gloria Tristani best sum up the concern brought about by large media mergers:
How information is presented and what stories are covered and, often
more important, what stories are not covered, has a significant impact
on public perceptions and the discussion of public issues. More channels do not necessarily mean that additional views are being expressed.
More channels often just mean
that the same voices can express their
3 59
views over and over again.
The trend toward corporate consolidation in the marketplace of ideas
must be reversed.
Donald R. Simont
355. See supra nn. 285-92 and accompanying text.
356. Feld, supra n. 23, at 20.
357. Robert Pitofsky Is Making It Clear He Believes Media Mergers Deserve Special

Scrutiny, Atlanta J & Const. 9D (Oct. 10, 1995).
358. "Diverse programming" refers to news and views that represent a cross-section of
opinions.
359. Ron Kaufman, Mergermania 2000: There Can Only Be One! TI 14 <http://www.

netreach.net/-kaufman/mergermania2000.html> (accessed Sept. 25, 2000) (quoting former
FCC Commissioner Gloria Tristani). Ms. Tristani's view is shared by the International
Federation of Journalists, which claim that: "[w]e are now seeing the dominance of a handful of companies controlling information and how that information reaches people. Unless
action is taken to insure journalistic independence we face a dangerous threat to media
diversity." Id.
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